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Abstract
We re-examine the theoretical concept of a production function for cog-
nitive achievement, and argue that an indirect production function that de-
pends upon the variables that constrain parents’ choices is both more tractable
from an econometric point of view, and more interesting from an economic
point of view than is a direct production function that depends upon a de-
tailed list of direct inputs such as number of books in the household. We es-
timate flexible econometric models of indirect production functions for two
achievement measures from the Woodcock-Johnson Revised battery, using
data from two waves of the Child Development Supplement to the PSID.
Elasticities of achievement measures with respect to family income and par-
ents’ educational levels are positive and significant. Gaps between scores of
black and white children narrow or remain constant as children grow older,
a result that differs from previous findings in the literature. The elasticities
of achievement scores with respect to family income are substantially higher
for children of black families, and there are some notable differences in elas-
ticities with respect to parents’ educational levels.
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1 Introduction
Much has been written on the development of children’s cognitive achievement
and its determinants1. This is hardly surprising, given the magnitude of soci-
ety’s investment in education, and the fundamental role of learning in the future
course of a child’s life. Both individually and collectively, few issues are equally
important in terms of long term welfare.
Much research has looked at the gap between the test scores of black and
white children. Some recent contributions that reference and summarize previ-
ous findings are Carneiro et al. (2005), Fryer and Levitt (2004), and Todd and
Wolpin (2004). These papers find evidence that gaps widen as children grow
older2. Fryer and Levitt find that controlling for covariates substantially explains
gaps in scores for children entering kindergarten, but that they subsequently in-
crease with age. Todd and Wolpin note that gaps in raw scores, without con-
trolling for different levels of covariates, increase with age. They find that the
magnitude of the gaps decreases when covariates are equalized, but they do not
look at how covariate-adjusted gaps evolve as children grow older.
Using a new data set and a more flexible econometric model, we examine two
measures of cognitive achievement, the Letter-Word (LW) and Applied Problems
(AP) tests from the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Tests of Achievement (Woodcock
and Johnson, 1989). We find that gaps in covariate-controlled LW and AP test
scores do exist, but that they either narrow substantially (the LW score) or re-
main more or less constant (the AP score) over the ages 6-17. We calculate the
elasticities of LW and AP scores with respect to parental education and family
income, and look at how these elasticities evolve over the course of childhood.
The scores of black children respond more strongly to changes in family income
and mother’s education than do the scores of white children. These findings may
1Havemann and Wolfe (1995) offer a general survey of the literature.
2The results concerning gaps that widen with age are Carneiro et al. (2005), page 7, Fryer and
Levitt (2004), page 455, and Todd and Wolpin (2004) pp. 23-24 and Figures 3a and 3b.
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shed some light on the possible sources of the existence of the gap in scores, and
can inform policy intended to reduce it.
We begin by re-examining the theoretical underpinnings of the econometric
approach to data on cognitive achievement, from the perspective of the produc-
tion function literature (Ben-Porath, 1967; Leibowitz, 1974; Todd and Wolpin,
2003). This helps us to more carefully select which variables to include in the
econometric model, and makes it clear that endogeneity of at least some variables
is likely to be of concern. We also take into serious consideration the issue of the
form of the cognitive achievement production function, in contrast to much of the
literature which assumes a simple linear form. A simple linear model is strongly
rejected by statistical tests, and a more richly parameterized model is needed to
explain the data. The richness of the econometric model allows us to uncover
dynamics in the evolution of test scores and elasticities that may be hidden by
more restrictive econometric models that impose stronger forms of parameter
constancy across groups.
As noted, we make use of a new data set. Much of the literature on the
evolution of cognitive achievement in economics has made use of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and the associated Children of the NLSY
(CNLSY) data (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). Korenman et al. (1995), Neal and
Johnson (1996), Blau (1999), Hansen et al. (2004), Todd and Wolpin (2004) and
Carneiro et al. (2005) are examples of papers that draw at least some of their con-
clusions using this data. Other data sets have also been used, to a lesser extent.
For example, Fryer and Levitt (2004) use the Early Childhood Longitudinal Sur-
vey (ECLS, National Center of Education Statistics, 2002). Our results are based
upon the Child Development Supplement (CDS) to the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) data (Mainieri, 2006). This is a rich data set, and to our knowl-
edge, this is the first paper by economists that uses it to estimate an educational
achievement production function. It is important to check the robustness of find-
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ings across different data sets to control for possible biases due to the specific way
survey information is gathered. Our findings show that the previous conclusions
regarding widening gaps are called into question when this new data set is used.
The next section considers the educational production function and the econo-
metric issues faced when attempting to estimate it. Section 3 discusses the data.
Section 4 presents the econometric model in detail and gives results related to the
choice of the final specification and the estimation method. Section 5 presents the
principal findings, and Section 6 gives conclusions and discusses directions for
future work.
2 The production of cognitive achievement
Children’s performance on achievement tests may be modeled as the output of a
production function, the inputs of which are determined by the family, the school
environment, and other factors. Todd and Wolpin (2003, henceforth, TW) provide
a detailed discussion, which we build upon. We assume that choices are made in
discrete time. Notationally, let a vector (indicated by lower case) indexed by t
indicate the current period values of a set of variables, and let a matrix (indicated
by upper case) represent the entire history up to the time of the index. For exam-
ple, At−1 = (a0, a1, ..., at−1). Let qt be a child’s achievement at time t. There is a
time-constant genetic endowment, µ, which is not directly observable. We pos-
tulate that current achievement qt depends on the endowment µ, as well as on
current and lagged inputs, from the time the child is born (t = 0) to the present.
Some inputs are chosen by the parents, either directly or indirectly, and others
are determined beyond the control of the parents. When discussing the theoret-
ical model, we will refer to parentally chosen inputs as endogenous, and exter-
nally chosen inputs as exogenous. The daily time that parents read to a child or
the number of books in the household are examples of directly chosen endoge-
4
nous inputs. One can easily think of a great number of such inputs. The number
of hours a child spends in regular school classes is in some cases indirectly chosen
by the family, through the choice of the school the child attends. The occurrence
of a serious illness that affects cognitive achievement or government-mandated
characteristics of curricula are examples of exogenous inputs.
Another issue is the issue of the observability of inputs. Some inputs, both
endogenous and exogenous, are not observable, at least to the econometrician.
Surveys can gather only a limited amount of information, and the number of
inputs that can affect cognitive achievement is no doubt large. Parents are also
likely to find reporting information about the way they raise their children to be
a sensitive topic, and this may induce substantial measurement error. We define
Xot =
(
xo0, x
o
1, ..., x
o
t
)
to be the matrix that holds the complete history of the observ-
able endogenous inputs up to time t. Likewise, Xut is the corresponding matrix
of unobservable endogenous inputs. We define Zot and Z
u
t to be the complete
histories of the observable and unobservable exogenous inputs, respectively.
The direct achievement production function is
qt = f (Xot , X
u
t , Z
o
t , Z
u
t ,µ,et) (1)
which we take to be the true technology that generates achievement. This equa-
tion is conceptually similar to TW’s equation 3, which they referred to as the
cumulative specification. Here, we explicitly recognize that many inputs, both
endogenous and exogenous, may not be observed, and we interpret the error, et,
as due to both possible measurement error and to random variations in perfor-
mance across individuals. TW deal with methods that can be used to estimate the
model when the endowment µ is not observed, assuming that all unobservable
inputs (Xut , Z
u
t ) are uncorrelated with the observed inputs X
o
t , Z
o
t . We find this
assumption to be quite implausible. Many of the inputs that are not observed
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by the econometrician will be endogenous, chosen by the parents jointly with the
observed endogenous inputs. Since the two sets of inputs, Xot and X
u
t , are chosen
by the parents, simultaneously and subject to the same constraints, it is difficult
to believe that they will be uncorrelated with one another. Measurement error
due to the use of possibly sensitive information reported by parents is likely to
reinforce an existing correlation.
We assume that parents choose the current period values of endogenous in-
puts to maximize some form of discounted expected family utility function. This
maximization will be subject to a budget constraint. Expectations will be formed
consistently with the currently available information (we define timing to be such
that current period values of exogenous variables are known when current period
endogenous variables are chosen), and will also depend upon the information
processing capabilities of the parents, which we refer to as the parents’ endow-
ments, and denote by the vector µP. The histories of the inputs, Xot−1, X
u
t−1, Z
o
t , Z
u
t ,
will affect the choices parents make regarding the current period endogenous in-
puts, xot , x
u
t . To simplify the exposition and notation, we make the simplifying
assumption that the family’s income (M) and parents’ endowments (µP) are all
known at the outset, and are constant over time. It is important to recognize
that parents learn about their children’s endowments over time, and that they
will adjust input levels accordingly. For simplicity, assume that the history of
achievement, Qt−1, is the full set of information that informs parents’ learning
about their child’s endowment. Then the optimal levels of the endogenous in-
puts in each period t will be the vector-valued functions xot (M,µp, Z
o
t , Z
u
t , Qt−1)
and xut (M,µp, Z
o
t , Z
u
t , Qt−1). These optimal solutions do not depend upon the pre-
vious histories of the endogenous variables, because those variables were in turn
chosen optimally in the past, as functions of the same arguments, with shorter
histories. Since these histories are already subsumed in the longer histories that
are the arguments of the current period optimal levels, there is no need to write
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them again as additional arguments. If the optimal levels of the endogenous
inputs are substituted (recursively) back into the direct production function of
equation 1, we obtain an indirect production function that depends upon the par-
ents’ endowments, family income, the history of exogenous factors, and the his-
tory of achievement test scores:
qt = f (Xot (M,µp, Z
o
t , Z
u
t , Qt−1), Xut (M,µp, Zot , Zut , Qt−1), Zot , Zut ,µ,et)
≡ g(M,µp, Zot , Zut ,µ, Qt−1,et) (2)
The indirect production function depends on previous achievement, as does the
well-known value-added model (Todd and Wolpin, 2003).
From the point of view of econometric estimation, the indirect production
function has several advantages, compared to the direct production function:
First, it depends upon many fewer arguments. The endogenous inputs of the
direct production function, the vectors Xot and X
u
t , include the full histories of
observed and unobserved items. The sheer number of direct inputs makes their
inclusion in a model problematic, due to both due to problems of missing data
and to severe collinearity between the variables that can be included. The use of
any particular index function to reduce the number of inputs to include will be
debatable. The number of variables in the indirect production function is much
smaller, since the endogenous inputs disappear, and the number of added vari-
ables, related to the restrictions to utility maximization, is small in comparison.
Second, there are less severe problems of endogeneity (in the econometric
sense) in the case of the indirect production function. For the direct produc-
tion function, the fact that observable and unobservable family-chosen inputs are
chosen jointly in response to common factors implies that observed inputs are
almost certainly correlated with unobserved inputs, as was noted above. If the
unobserved inputs go into the econometric error term, there will be a problem of
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econometric endogeneity in the case of the included family-chosen direct inputs.
The fact that both current and lagged achievement depend upon the child’s en-
dowment µ, does lead to concern about the endogeneity of Qt−1, as is noted by
Todd and Wolpin (2003, pp. F20-F22). We believe that this is less problematic than
is the endemic endogeneity of the family-chosen inputs in a model of the direct
production function. Well-known econometric methods can be used to deal with
the possible endogeneity of the history of achievement.
Third, the indirect production function provides a simpler, clearer framework
within which to analyze policies directed to improve children’s acquisition of
cognitive achievement. Policy might affect family income in the short run, and
parents’ endowments in the longer run, and the indirect function depends upon
these variables. Policy changes that affect exogenous factors such as school char-
acteristics can also be analyzed using the indirect production function. The effect
of policies on the inputs of the direct function would be many, diverse, and diffi-
cult to predict. The direct function requires information at a level of detail that is
difficult to supply during the estimation phase, and it supplies information that
is difficult to interpret and use at the stage of policy formation.
Finally, though knowledge of the direct production function is no doubt in-
teresting, it is not fundamentally an economic issue. Other areas of science, and
methods other than econometric inference, are likely to tell us more about the
detailed process through which children’s cognitive achievement changes in re-
sponse to direct inputs. If experimental or observational methods were used,
the issue of endogeneity of inputs could be dealt with more effectively and con-
vincingly than by applying instrumental variables estimation methods to survey
data.
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3 Data
As noted in the introduction, we use two data sets linked to one another. The
oldest and most well-known is the Panel Study for Income Dynamics (PSID).
The PSID is a longitudinal survey containing socio-economic information of a
representative sample of families of the U.S., with data at the level of the individ-
ual. The second source of data is the Child Development Supplement (CDS) to
the PSID (Mainieri, 2006). The CDS contains detailed information about cogni-
tive achievement, health status, time use at home and at school, and information
about schools, for children from PSID families. There are two waves of CDS data,
CDS-I and CDS-II, the first gathered in 1997 and the second in 2002-2003. The
CDS-II wave is based on interviews of 91% of the families that participated in
CDS-I. Combining the PSID and the two waves of the CDS, we obtain time series
data on several measures of children’s cognitive achievement, as well as covari-
ates such as family income, parental education, race, time use, etc.
As measures of cognitive achievement, we use the Letter-Word (LW) and Ap-
plied Problems (AP) subscales of the Woodcock-Johnson Revised Tests of Achieve-
ment (Woodcock and Johnson, 1989) as measures of verbal and mathematical
achievement, respectively. Both scores range from 0 to 60. We use the scores
from both CDS waves, to obtain the current and historical scores, qt and Qt, of
the previous section. We restrict our sample to children who lived with the same
two parents in both CDS waves. Dealing with heterogeneous and changing fam-
ily structures is left for future work. We use the years of education of the mother
and the father as measures of the parents’ endowments (µp). Our measure of in-
come (M) is family income per family member, at the time of the second wave.
We also explored using average family income across the two CDS waves and a
more flexible specification where total family income appears as a regressor and
the number of siblings as another. Such specifications give results that are very
similar to those we report, using our chosen measure of income. The observable
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exogenous variables (the Zot of the previous section) are race, sex, and age of the
child. For the variables we use, the available sample size is 983 children.
In the available data, the only usable characteristic of schools attended by the
children in the sample were the average class size, since missing data rendered
the sample too small if other measures were used. Average class size had no
significant impact on the results, so we do not use this variable in the results we
report.
We also did some exploratory work with the time-use diary data that the CDS
contains, looking at daily hours parents’ spent actively interacting with their chil-
dren, and total amount of time children spent watching television. These vari-
ables may be thought of as direct endogenous inputs to the achievement pro-
duction function. Following our theoretical presentation of the last section, we
would argue that a proper indirect production function should not include di-
rect endogenous inputs as arguments. If a direct input is included, it should not
contribute significantly to the explanatory power of a model of the indirect pro-
duction function, supposing that the income and parental endowment variables
introduced though the substitution of the optimal solutions into the direct model
are well measured, and the functional form of the model is adequate. When the
time-use diary variables were included in our model, they did not have any sig-
nificant impact and their exclusion was not rejected by formal statistical tests.
Based upon the above considerations, we interpret this insignificance as evidence
in favor of the specification of our model, which is explained in detail in the next
section.
Work by other authors has included parentally-chosen inputs such as number
of books in the household, and they have appeared as significant (for example,
Todd and Wolpin (2004); Fryer and Levitt (2004)). However, Todd and Wolpin’s
paper is an explicit attempt to model a direct production function, and they pur-
posely do not include any measure of family income or parental education in
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their model. It is not surprising that a small number of direct inputs appear sig-
nificantly when the variables that would appear after substituting in the optimal
solutions are excluded from the model. Fryer and Levitt’s model might be in-
terpreted as a mixed direct/indirect production function, since it has both direct
inputs and variables that enter though constraints. They make use of a single
socioeconomic status index, which is a composite of family income, parental ed-
ucation and other factors. Perhaps the significance of the direct input might be in
part due to the inability of this single index to adequately account for the separate
effects of income and parental endowments.
4 The econometric model
Much of the econometric literature on estimation of the relationship between ed-
ucational achievement and conditioning factors assumes a simple linear relation-
ship between the inputs and the output, and issues of functional form and possi-
ble nonlinearities have only seldom been addressed (Baker, 2001). It is important
to recognize that a simple linear model imposes strong restrictions on the produc-
tion function. The marginal effects of all variables are constant, and elasticities
cannot freely vary, even at a single arbitrary point of evaluation. Our econometric
model of the indirect production function allows for nonlinear and cross-variable
effects, along the lines of the flexible functional form literature (Caves and Chris-
tensen, 1980). We find that nonlinearities and interaction effects are important,
and are overlooked when one estimates a simple linear model of the type com-
monly encountered.
Our data is a cross section of individuals, each observed in the second wave of
the CDS at a specific age between 6 and 17 years old. Because we model only the
LW and AP scores at the time of the second wave of the CDS, we drop the t sub-
script that was used previously in the general treatment. Since we do not assume
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that achievement is constant with respect to age, we use age (AGE) as an ob-
servable exogenous variable (one of the components of Zo). The other observable
exogenous variables we use are dummy variables for gender (SEX) and ethnic
background (the groupings are black (B), white (W) and other, which is the de-
fault, absorbed in the constant).3 As measurements of the parents’ endowments
(µP), we use the mother’s (ME) and the father’s (FE) years of education. Income
(M) is measured as total family income divided by the number of family mem-
bers. We only have data on a single lagged achievement score, so we assume that
the entire history of achievement Q−1 can be approximated by the single lag, q−1.
We collect these eight variables in the vector x= (ME, FE,q−1, AGE, M,SEX, B,W).
We assume that the indirect production function is additively separable in the ob-
servable and unobservable arguments. For a representative individual, we write
q = q(x) + η(Zu,e)
We define η ≡ η(Zu,e), and treat it as an econometric error term. We specify a
quadratic parametric model for q(x), so our econometric specification is
q = α + x′β + 1
2
x′Γx + η (3)
To simplify notation, we note that the quadratic model may be written, with ap-
propriate definitions, as
α + x′β + 1
2
x′Γx = z(x)′θ,
so
q = z′θ + η. (4)
3The available sample did not allow for more detailed treatment of ethnic groups.
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The vector-valued function z = z(x) contains the original vector x as well as a
constant term and the squares and cross-products of the elements of x, and the
vector θ contains all the free parameters in α,β and Γ. To identify the Γ matrix, we
restrict it to be symmetric, and the coefficients of the squared dummy variables
and interactions between ethnic group dummies are restricted to be zero.
We anticipate that there may be endogeneity of q−1, as is discussed above,
but we assume that the other components of x are exogenous. In our quadratic
model, the possible endogeneity of q−1 spreads to a number of the components of
z = z(x). To address this, we perform generalized instrumental variables (GIV)
estimation. Our instruments are the elements of z that do not involve q−1, as well
as the elements of z−1 (obtained from the first wave (CDS-I) data) that do not
involve q−2. We also estimate using OLS.
Plots of the GIV and OLS residuals strongly suggest that the errors are het-
eroscedastic. White’s test for homoscedasticity (White, 1980), using z as the vari-
ables that explain the squared GIV residual in the artificial regression, strongly
rejects homoscedasticity, for both the LW and AP scores (Tables 1 and 2, row 1).
To improve efficiency in estimation, we henceforth use a partial correction for
heteroscedasticity. The variance of the error of the error is specified as V(η) =
exp(α1+α2 log AGE) (separate models are used for LW and AP scores). We con-
tinue to apply a heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix estimator, to allow
for residual heteroscedasticity that is not captured by this simple model of the
error variance.
The theoretical development of the last section suggests that the regressors
in z that depend upon q−1 are likely to be endogenous. To test for exogeneity,
the standard Hausman test requires that one of the two estimators use to define
the vector of contrasts be fully efficient under the null hypothesis of exogeneity.
In our case, the least squares estimator is unlikely to be fully efficient. Without
the heteroscedasticity correction it is certainly inefficient, and with the simple
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correction, any remaining unmodelled heteroscedasticity or nonnormality of the
errors also imply that the least squares estimator is inefficient. This would cause
the standard Hausman test to become invalid. Creel (2004) develops a modified
version of the Hausman test that is valid when neither of the two estimators that
are contrasted is efficient.
Tables 1 and 2, rows 2 and 3, present the standard and modified Hausman
test statistics for the null hypothesis of exogeneity of all regressors, without the
heteroscedasticity correction. In the case of the LW score (Table 1), the standard
Hausman test without the GLS correction (row 2) suggests rejection of exogene-
ity. This result is of doubtful validity, since the Hausman test is invalid in the
presence of heteroscedasticity, which almost certainly exists, given the test re-
sults reported in row 1 of the Tables. The modified test (row 3), which is valid in
the presence of heteroscedasticity does not reject at any conventional significance
level. Lines 4 and 5 present the standard and modified Hausman tests, using the
partial GLS modelling of the variance of the error term. We see that neither test
rejects exogeneity at the 10% significance level. For the standard Hausman test,
the reversal of the conclusion depending upon whether or not a GLS correction is
done shows the dangers of relying on this test when using inefficient estimators.
The modified test gives the same result with or without the GLS correction. In
the case of the AP score (Table 2, rows 2-5), neither version of the test rejects at
conventional significance levels, regardless of whether or not the GLS correction
is used. Overall, when a valid test is used, exogeneity is not rejected. Given this,
and the greater efficiency of least squares compared to GIV, the results we present
below are based upon least squares estimation using the simple heteroscedastic-
ity correction.
The full quadratic specification, with only the necessary restrictions for iden-
tification, contains 41 free parameters. It is possible that this level of flexibility
is not needed to successfully capture the features of the data. We tested some
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parameter restrictions in an effort to obtain a more parsimonious model. Tables 1
and 2, rows 6-9 reports results for Wald tests of several hypotheses. The hypothe-
ses tested, and the corresponding rows the Tables are:
• (row 6) The model can be reduced to a simple linear specification, without
interaction or nonlinearities in the variables. This hypothesis implies that
Γ in equation 3 is a matrix of zeros. This hypothesis is strongly (p < 0.001)
rejected for both the LW and AP scores.
• (row 7) The three racial groupings (black, white, other) can be pooled to-
gether. This hypothesis is strongly (p < 0.001) rejected for both LW and
AP.
• (row 8) The black and other racial groups can be pooled. This hypothesis is
rejected at the 10% significance level for both AP and LW.
• (row 9) Boys and girls can be pooled together. This hypothesis is rejected at
the 10% level for both the LW and AP scores.
All of the hypotheses tested are rejected fairly convincingly, at at least the 10%
level. Thus, we do not impose any restrictions upon the general quadratic speci-
fication (equation 3). The data exhibit nonlinearities and interactions that cannot
be captured by a simple linear model.
5 Results
Our econometric model has a large number of parameters (41). Since the model
includes nonlinearities and interactions between variables, the individual param-
eters do not have an interesting interpretation, and for this reason, we do not
present parameter estimates4. Instead, we present plots of predicted LW and
4Parameter estimates are available upon request.
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AP scores, and elasticities of both predicted scores with respect to some of the
explanatory variables, along with 2 standard error bars. Since estimated elastici-
ties are nonlinear functions of the estimated parameters of the models, the delta
method5 was used to calculate the estimated standard errors of the elasticities.
Figures 1 and 2 present elasticities and fits, by the age of the child. In all cases
we evaluate the elasticity or fit at the overall sample means (except income, where
we use the median) of the explanatory variables, given the age of the child. It is
important to calculate the evaluation point conditional on age, since the distribu-
tion of the regressors is not independent of age. Lagged score is strongly depen-
dent on age, and family income and parental education are weakly dependent6.
These plots average over the race and sex dummy variables, so they represent an
”average” child. Later we look at more specific results.
Looking first at the plots for the LW score (Figure 1), in panel (a) we see the
predicted LW score as a function of age. It is strongly increasing between ages 7
to 14, after which it levels off and even falls at age 17. In panel (b) we see that the
elasticity with respect to lagged score is positive, significantly different from zero
at all ages, and trending upwards. Note that this elasticity would be equal to one
for a person who had arrived to a stable level of LW score, since the lagged score
would be equal to current score, and a one percent higher lagged score would
imply a one percent higher current score. With this in mind, we see that even at
age 17, the elasticity is still significantly less than one. The fact that the elasticity
is different from one at age 17 means that the LW score is still malleable between
ages 12 to 17, which is confirmed by the results in panel (a) that show that LW
score is not constant over these ages.
In panels (c) and (d), we see the elasticities of the LW score with respect to
the mother’s and father’s years of education, respectively. The elasticity with
respect to mother’s educational level is positive and significantly different from
5See, for example, Cameron and Trivedi (2005).
6Older children have older parents, who have higher incomes and more education, on average.
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zero at all ages. It exhibits a U shape, with a minimum at 13 years of age. The
elasticity with respect to father’s educational level is smaller in magnitude for
almost all ages, and it is only barely significantly different from zero between the
ages 7 to 13. For other ages, it is not significantly different from zero. The overall
trend is downward. We see that the impact of parents’ educational level is larger
early in life. It is important to remember that early gains have permanent effects,
since they are incorporated into the lagged score variable, which positively affects
current score (see panel (b)).
Panel (e) shows the elasticity of LW with respect to family income. This elas-
ticity is positive and significant up to age 11, at which point it becomes insignifi-
cantly different from zero. Nevertheless, the early effects of larger family income
will continue to have a positive long run effect on predicted LW, since early gains
are transmitted forward by the lagged score variable.
Panel (f) shows the elasticity of LW with respect to the child’s age, plotted by
age. This panel requires a careful interpretation, since the partial derivative of
score with respect to age, used to calculate the elasticity, holds the lagged score
constant. However, as we have seen in panel (a), scores, and consequently lagged
scores too, generally rise with age. Lagged score is remaining constant as age
increases could be interpreted as a case of learning difficulties. This would imply
a lower predicted score, and a negative elasticity, as is observed in the plot.
Next, we turn to discussion of Figure 2, which plots the fitted AP score and
the elasticities of AP with respect to the explanatory variables. Panel (a) shows
fitted AP, by age. The fitted value increases with age, up to 14 years of age, at
which point it levels off and then declines. This is similar to the pattern observed
for LW, in Figure 1, panel (a). The test scores of 17 year-olds drop considerably
for some reason. We can only speculate as to the explanation for this.
In panel (b), the elasticity of AP with respect to lagged score is positive, sig-
nificant, and trending upward. At age 17, the elasticity is 0.76. The comparable
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elasticity for LW is only 0.60. This suggests that LW scores remain more malleable
at age 17 than are AP scores.
Panels (c) and (d) show the elasticities of AP with respect to mother’s and
father’s educational levels. The elasticity with respect to the mother’s educational
level is positive and everywhere significant, and the elasticity with respect to
the father’s educational level is significantly different from zero over ages 9-14,
during which period the magnitude of the elasticity exceeds that of the mother’s
educational level. Beyond age 14, the U shape of the elasticity with respect to
mother’s education is in the rising portion. The educational level of both parents
is important. The importance of the father’s educational level clear in the case of
AP, and weak in the case of LW. For the mother’s educational level, the effect is
clear in the cases of both scores.
Panel (e) of Figure 2 shows the elasticity of AP with respect to family income.
The shape is very similar that observed in panel (e) of Figure 1, for LW, except
that the magnitude of the elasticity is higher in the case of AP. Income has a sig-
nificant positive effect in early years, up to age 12. Afterwards, the elasticity is not
significantly different from zero. However, it is important to remember that the
early impact is transmitted forward in the form of a higher value for the lagged
score variable, which positively affects AP (panel (b)).
Panel (f) shows the elasticity with respect to age. The interpretation is the
same as is given above for the case of LW. The elasticity is again negative and
significant at all ages.
The results reported up to now are for an ”average child”, with all condition-
ing variables, including racial and gender dummies, set to their sample mean
values. There exists a considerable literature that has analyzed differences in test
scores between racial groups, with most of the focus on blacks and whites, due
to the larger samples that are available. Fryer and Levitt (2004) give a detailed
discussion and many references. Fryer and Levitt find that a gap in raw test
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scores exists, but that for children entering kindergarten the gap is not signifi-
cantly different from zero after controlling for factors such as the socioeconomic
background of the family and the number of books in the child’s home. They
find that the gap widens with age, however, even after controlling for covariates
(Fryer and Levitt, 2004, pg. 455). Our data allows us to examine this prediction.
In Tables 3 and 4 we give the descriptive statistics for raw LW and AP scores,
by age and race, without controlling for any covariates. We see that there is a gap
in raw scores, both for LW and AP. The gap in LW scores is somewhat variable
as a function of age. Overall the average gap is about 3.5-4 points. The gap in
raw AP scores increases up to age 11, after which it is more or less constant at
about 5.5 points (a little less than 1 standard deviation). The pattern that emerges
from these summary statistics is a bit difficult to interpret, due to their variability,
which is a result of the small sample sizes in some of the cells (for example, the
sample contains no six year old black children). But it is quite clear that a gap in
raw scores exists, and that it is larger for teenagers than for 8 year olds.
Turning to the results of the econometric model that allows for controlling for
the effects of covariates, we now look at plots similar to those given in Figures 1
and 2, but looking specifically at blacks and whites, by setting the racial dummy
variables accordingly. The other explanatory variables remain set at their overall
sample means (except income, which is set to the sample median). For clarity, we
do not plot standard error bars. A good idea of the precision of the estimates may
be gotten from Figures 1 2.
Figure 3 shows the fitted LW, and the elasticity of LW with respect to condi-
tioning variables, by age of child, for blacks and whites. In panel (a), we see that
a clear black-white gap exists, but it is markedly smaller than the raw gap that
does not take into account the levels of covariates, in Table 3. It also declines sub-
stantially as children grow older, narrowing from 2.5-3 points down to roughly
1 point. The LW score of blacks is considerably more elastic with respect to the
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mother’s educational level (panel c) and income (panel e) than is the LW score of
whites. Race does not appear to be a significant factor in the elasticity of LW with
respect to the father’s educational level (panel d). For younger children, both
parents’ educational levels are important, with the mother’s educational level of
particular importance for blacks. As children grow older, the mother’s educa-
tional level is of more importance than is the father’s, for both races. It appears
that the impact of the mother’s educational level gains importance as children
near high school age.
The LW score of children of black families is more elastic with respect to in-
come than is the case of children of white families, for children of all ages (panel
e), though income elasticities are low in both cases. Again, these results need to
be interpreted with some care. LW responds positively to income, at all ages, for
both blacks and whites. For this reason, children of higher income families will
have somewhat higher scores, and they will also have somewhat higher values
of the lagged LW score. However, the plots in Figure 3 set the value of the lagged
score to the overall sample mean. This ignores the impact on LW of higher in-
come in the past. The overall effect of a permanent increase in family income
on the evolution of a child’s LW score over ages 6-17 would be larger than Fig-
ure 3 implies, due to the dynamic effect that is transmitted forward though the
lagged score. Early gains persist, as is reflected in panel (b) of the Figure, where
the elasticity of current LW with respect to lagged LW is seen to be positive at all
ages.
Figure 4 shows fitted AP scores and elasticities for blacks and whites. Panel
(a) shows predicted AP. There is a gap that remains more or less constant at 2-2.5
points - in this case it does not narrow with age. However, it is clearly not in-
creasing with age, as Fryer and Levitt (2004) predicted, based upon extrapolating
their results for younger children. It is also less than half the gap observed in raw
AP scores, as can be seen comparing the 2-2.5 point gap in Figure ?? with the 5-6
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point gap in raw scores, in Table 4.
Panel (c) shows that the elasticity of the AP score with respect to the mother’s
educational level is larger for black children than for white children, similarly to
what was found in the case of the LW score. In contrast, panel (d) shows that the
elasticity of AP score with respect to the father’s educational level is larger for
white children. For white children, the impact of the father’s years of education
is more important than the mother’s years of education, between 7 to 16 years of
age. For black children, the impact of the mother’s years of education is always
larger that the impact of the father’s years of education. Panel (e) shows that the
elasticity of AP score with respect to income is 3 to 4 times larger for blacks than
for whites. This is a similar result to the case of the LW score, but in the present
case the difference is even more dramatic.
6 Conclusions
Like the previous literature, we have found that there are substantial gaps in raw
achievement scores between black and white children (Tables 3 and 4). The gaps
narrow considerably when an econometric model is used to control for the effect
of covariates (Figures 3 and 4). After accounting for covariates, the gap narrows
with age in the case of the LW (verbal/reading) score and remains constant in the
case of the AP (math) score. As noted in the introduction to this paper, there is a
fairly large amount of literature that documents gaps that widen with age, even
after accounting for covariates. Much of this work uses the NLSY and CNLSY
data. Also, many of these studies use econometric models that impose a stronger
degree of parameter constancy across sample subgroups than does our model.
We find that such restrictions on our econometric model are rejected by formal
statistical tests. Our work has two distinguishing factors: the CDS data that we
use, and a more flexible econometric model than those of most similar studies. To
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determine whether our result on gaps that do not widen is due to the new data
or to the more flexible econometric model, it would be interesting to estimate an
econometric model similar to ours using other data sets.
Another result of our work is the observation that elasticities of achievement
scores with respect to family income and parents’ educational levels differ across
black and white children. The fact that elasticities differ, in some cases quite
markedly, may be indicative of certain cultural differences between black and
white families. Such factors could explain at least in part the simple existence of
the observed gaps. Differences in elasticities could conceivably be exploited by
policies intended to address the score gap, though the political feasibility of such
measures would be questionable.
An important factor that we have not taken into account in this work are pos-
sible differences in the qualities of the schools attended by children. The basic
CDS data is not particularly well suited to the use of school characteristics, since
the usable sample size is greatly diminished when such variables are included
in the analysis. Given that the effect of including covariates in the econometric
model is to contribute to the explanation of the gap in test scores, we expect that
the most important effect of omitting school characteristics is to leave a larger
residual gap than would be the case if such variables could be included. We hope
to use other data sources to extend our work in this direction in the future.
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Tables
Table 1: Hypothesis test results, LW score
Row Null hypothesis Test Distribution under H0 Test value p-value
1 Homosced. White χ2(40) 251.82 0.000
2 Exog. (no GLS) Hausman nominally, χ2(9) 31.50 0.000
3 Exog. (no GLS) Hausman (mod.) χ2(9) 8.31 0.503
4 Exog. (GLS) Hausman nominally, χ2(9) 6.37 0.703
5 Exog. (GLS) Hausman (mod.) χ2(9) 13.65 0.135
6 Simple linear model Wald χ2(32) 152.41 0.000
7 Black=White=Other Wald χ2(14) 47.00 0.000
8 Black=Other Wald χ2(7) 12.63 0.082
7 boys=girls Wald χ2(8) 14.26 0.075
Table 2: Hypothesis test results, AP score
Row Null hypothesis Test Distribution under H0 Test value p-value
1 Homosced. White χ2(40) 151.35 0.000
2 Exog. (no GLS) Hausman nominally, χ2(9) 4.94 0.839
3 Exog. (no GLS) Hausman (mod.) χ2(9) 8.29 0.505
4 Exog. (GLS) Hausman nominally, χ2(9) 6.85 0.653
5 Exog. (GLS) Hausman (mod.) χ2(9) 10.44 0.316
4 Simple linear model Wald χ2(32) 87.72 0.000
5 Black=White=Other Wald χ2(14) 66.09 0.000
6 Black=Other Wald χ2(7) 12.20 0.094
7 boys=girls Wald χ2(8) 13.79 0.088
Table 3: LW score by age and race
age mean (overall) mean (blacks) mean (whites) gap gap/se
6.000 40.333 NA 40.250 NA NA
7.000 39.250 36.474 40.106 -3.633 -0.577
8.000 43.655 41.926 44.623 -2.697 -0.568
9.000 44.011 42.053 45.527 -3.475 -0.598
10.000 46.170 44.571 47.613 -3.041 -0.568
11.000 46.385 43.769 47.629 -3.860 -0.599
12.000 48.524 45.680 49.746 -4.066 -0.807
13.000 49.450 47.174 50.470 -3.296 -0.642
14.000 50.560 49.222 51.388 -2.166 -0.471
15.000 49.770 46.324 51.782 -5.458 -1.091
16.000 51.986 51.000 52.362 -1.362 -0.429
17.000 48.688 44.750 52.286 -7.536 -1.097
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Table 4: AP score by age and race
age mean (overall) mean (blacks) mean (whites) gap gap/se
6.000 31.500 NA 32.500 NA NA
7.000 32.486 29.158 34.000 -4.842 -1.033
8.000 35.370 33.111 36.416 -3.304 -0.793
9.000 36.682 34.105 38.127 -4.022 -0.922
10.000 39.000 36.333 40.452 -4.118 -0.812
11.000 40.010 36.269 41.919 -5.650 -0.949
12.000 40.981 37.240 42.716 -5.476 -0.985
13.000 43.290 39.348 45.227 -5.879 -0.923
14.000 44.211 39.630 46.522 -6.893 -0.977
15.000 42.880 39.382 45.182 -5.799 -0.870
16.000 44.757 41.333 46.447 -5.113 -0.803
17.000 42.750 39.625 45.571 -5.946 -0.915
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Figures
Figure 1: LW score, Fit and Elasticities, by age of child, with 2 standard error bars
(a) Fit (b) Lagged score
(c) Mother’s education (d) Father’s education
(e) Income (f) Age
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Figure 2: AP score, Fit and Elasticities, by age of child, with 2 standard error bars
(a) Fit (b) Lagged score
(c) Mother’s education (d) Father’s education
(e) Income (f) Age
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Figure 3: LW score, Black-White differences, Fit and Elastisticities
(a) Fit (b) Lagged score
(c) Mother’s education (d) Father’s education
(e) Income (f) Age
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Figure 4: AP score, Black-White differences, Fit and Elastisticities
(a) Fit (b) Lagged score
(c) Mother’s education (d) Father’s education
(e) Income (f) Age
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